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THE ENIGMA OF WYNNE
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY
ABSTRACT
The five-justice Wynne majority used that case to make a
major statement about the dormant Commerce Clause. In many
respects, Wynne is an enigma that perpetuates an inherent
problem ofthe Court
s dormant Commerce Clause doctrine: the
Court declares some ill-defined taxes as unconstitutionally discriminatory because they encourage in-state investment, while
other economically equivalent taxes and government programs
that similarly encourage intrastate economicactivity are apparentlyacceptable under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Wynne is thus more important than the immediate situation it
addresses, and willhave consequences beyond the immediate circumstances it addresses. A decision as enigmaticas it is important, Wynne raises as manyquestions as it answers. Among these
are the continuing viabilityofexternalconsistencyand apportionment, concepts that have been centralto the Court
s formulation
ofthe dormant Commerce Clause. Wynne also undermines the
Court
s traditionaltolerance ofthe double state income taxation
ofdualresidents because such double taxation can encourage a
dualresident to undertake single-taxed in-state economicactivity
rather than make investments subject to such double taxation.

Edward A. Zelinsky is the Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law
at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
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INTRODUCTION
Marylands county income tax does not grant a credit to Maryland residents for the out-of-state income taxes such residents
pay on the income they earn outside of Maryland.1 In Comptroller
ofthe Treasury ofMaryland v. Wynne, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that this failure causes the Maryland county income tax to
violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.2
This result, while important, is self-contained: the states personal
income taxes generally extend credits to their respective residents
for the out-of-state income taxes such residents pay. Consequently,
such state income taxes already comply with Wynne.
Many local income taxes, like the Maryland county tax, do not
grant credits for income taxes paid out-of-state.3 However, while
local income taxes are important sources of municipal revenue in
particular parts of the country, most Americans are not subject
to a city or a county income tax, as were Mr. and Mrs. Wynne.4
On another level, Wynnes implications extend significantly
beyond the particular facts of that case. Contrary to what this
Author had anticipated,5 the five-justice Wynne majority used
that case to make a major statement about the dormant Commerce Clause. In many respects, Wynne is an enigma that perpetuates an inherent problem of the Courts dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine: the Court declares that some ill-defined taxes
are unconstitutionally discriminatory because such taxes encourage in-state investment, while other economically equivalent taxes
and government programs that similarly encourage intrastate
economic activity are apparently acceptable under the dormant
Commerce Clause.
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
Id.
3 Id. at 1792.
4 Id.
5 This Author had anticipated the analysis reflected in Justice Ginsburgs
Wynne dissenting opinion which received the support of only three members
of the Court, Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia. See 135 S. Ct. at 1813
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Edward A. Zelinsky, Why Wynne Worries Me, 67
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 207, 211 (2014); Edward A. Zelinsky, Wynne and the
Double Taxation ofDualResidents, 73 ST. TAX NOTES 259 (2014).
1
2
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Wynne is thus more important than the immediate situation it
addresses. Just as a mundane dispute over a minor presidential
appointment gave rise to the U.S. Supreme Courts seminal statement of the power of judicial review,6 Wynne will have consequences beyond the immediate circumstances it addresses. A
decision as enigmatic as it is important, Wynne raises as many
questions as it answers. Among these are the continuing viability (or not) of external consistency and apportionment, concepts
that have been central to the Courts formulation of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Wynne also undermines the Courts traditional tolerance of the double state income taxation of dual residents because such double taxation can encourage a dual resident
to undertake single-taxed, in-state economic activity rather than
make investments subject to such double taxation.
I. THE SUPREME COURTS WYNNE OPINION
Marylands county income tax provides no credit to resident
taxpayers for the out-of-state income taxes such residents pay.7
The Wynnes, residents of Howard County, Maryland, had income
from an S-corporation that operates in thirty-nine states.8 In accordance with the provisions of Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code,9 the Wynnes reported their share of the corporations
out-of-state income on their Maryland state and county income
tax returns.10 The Wynnes received a credit on their Maryland
state tax return for the out-of-state taxes they paid on the income
earned by their S-corporation outside of Maryland.11 However, the
Wynnes received no credit against their Maryland county income
taxes for income taxes they paid to states other than Maryland.12
A five-justice majoritysustaining Marylands highest court,
the Court of Appealsheld that the Maryland county income tax
violated the dormant Commerce Clause by failing to grant the
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 179293 (describing the facts of the case).
8 The Courts opinion says that the Wynnes S-corporation filed state
income tax returns in 39 States. Id. at 1793.
9 Id. at 1793 n.1 (summarizing the operation of Subchapter S).
10 Id. at 1793.
11 Id.
12 Id.
6
7
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Wynnes a credit for the out-of-state income taxes that the Wynnes
paid.13 Justice Alitos opinion for the Wynne Court propounds
several themes. Among the most important is the analogy between the creditless Maryland county income tax and a tariff:
because there is no credit under Marylands county income tax
for out-of-state income taxes, the Maryland county tax has the
same economic effect as a state tariff, the quintessential evil targeted by the dormant Commerce Clause.14 [T]he Maryland tax
scheme, because it does not grant a credit against the county income tax for residents out-of-state income tax payments, is tantamount to a tariff on work done out of State.15
Justice Alito further reaffirmed the dormant Commerce
Clause principle of nondiscrimination, writing that the dormant
Commerce Clause precludes States from discriminating between
transactions on the basis of some interstate element:16
[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily
when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within
the State. Nor may a State impose a tax which discriminates
against interstate commerce either by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business, or by subjecting interstate
commerce to the burden of multiple taxation.17

Justice Alitos Wynne opinion places its chief reliance not on
the Courts more recent dormant Commerce Clause cases, but
on J.D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,18 Gwin, White &
Prince, Inc. v. Henneford,19 and CentralGreyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey.20 Each of these earlier cases, Justice Alito wrote, struck
down a state tax scheme that might have resulted in the double
taxation of income earned out of the State and that discriminated
in favor of intrastate over interstate economic activity.21 Justice
Alito also wrote, Marylands tax scheme is unconstitutional for
similar reasons.22
Id.
Id. at 1792.
15 Id. at 180607.
16 Id. at 1794 (internal citations omitted).
17 Id. (internal citations omitted).
18 J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
19 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
20 Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
21 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795.
22 Id.
13
14
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[T]he tax schemes held to be unconstitutional in J.D. Adams,
Gwin, White, and CentralGreyhound, had the potential to result in the discriminatory double taxation of income earned out
of state and created a powerful incentive to engage in intrastate rather than interstate economic activity.23

Central to Justice Ginsburgs Wynne dissent24 are the arguments that residents, like the Wynnes, benefit greatly from public
services.25 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg argues that such residents vote for the Maryland officials who impose the creditless
Maryland county income tax on the Wynnes.26 Consequently,
Justice Ginsburg argued, whether the Maryland county income
tax should (or should not) grant a credit for out-of-state income
taxes is a question of policy that should be decided through the
political process.27
In reply, Justice Alito pointed to the Courts dormant Commerce Clause cases protecting corporations from state income
taxes.28 [I]t is, he concluded, hard to see why the dormant
Commerce Clause should treat individuals less favorably than
corporations.29
Like residents, corporations also benefit heavily from state
and local services including roads, police and fire departments,
and schools which help to attract and retain employees.30 Nevertheless, the dormant Commerce Clause constrains the states ability to tax these service-receiving corporations.
Justice Alito also rejected Justice Ginsburgs contention that
the Wynnes do not need the protection of the dormant Commerce
Clause since, as Maryland residents, the Wynnes vote for the
Maryland officials who tax them: [I]f a States tax unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce, it is invalid
Id. at 180102.
Id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
25 Id. at 1814.
26 Id. at 181415.
27 Id. This Author had expected the Court to agree with the argument that
the Wynnes, as Maryland voters, were not entitled to dormant Commerce Clause
protection from the taxes levied on them by the officials for whom they vote.
See Zelinsky, WhyWynne Worries Me, supra note 5, at 21314.
28 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795.
29 Id. at 1797.
30 Id.
23
24
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regardless of whether the plaintiff is a resident voter or nonresident of the State.31
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito dismissed as fanciful32
the notion that the victims of such discrimination have a complete remedy at the polls.33 The argument that the Wynnes can
protect themselves in Marylands political processes would leave
no security where the majority of voters prefer protectionism at
the expense of the few who earn income interstate.34 Moreover,
large corporations headquartered in the State35 have political
influence but are nevertheless protected by the strictures of the
dormant Commerce Clause rather than consigned to their political remedies.36
Justice Alitos Wynne opinion is thus a full-throated affirmation
that the dormant Commerce Clause constrains the states ability
to tax their residents incomes. Justice Alito distinguished between the requirements of the Constitutions Due Process Clause
and of the dormant Commerce Clause.37 The Due Process Clause
allows a state to tax all of its residents incomes.38 However, the
Commerce Clause constrains the states ability to tax its residents incomes. That is precisely the situation presented by
Wynne: [T]he fact that a State has the jurisdictional power to
impose a tax [as a matter of Due Process] says nothing about
whether that tax violates the Commerce Clause.39
Id.
Id. at 1798.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Justices Alito and Ginsburg also debated the significance (if any) of the
fact that the Maryland county income tax is a tax on net income, while the
taxes at issue in J.D. Adams, Gwin, and CentralGreyhound were taxes on
gross income. Compare id. at 179597 (Justice Alitos majority opinion rejecting that the Commerce Clause distinguishes between taxes on net and gross
income), with id. at 181920 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ([T]he Court has routinely maintained that the difference between taxes on net income and taxes
on gross receipts from interstate commerce warrants different results under
the Commerce Clause.) (citation omitted).
37 Id. at 179899.
38 Id. at 1798.
39 Id. at 1799.
31
32
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Also central to Justice Alitos Wynne opinion is the dormant
Commerce Clause test that has been denoted as internal consistency.40 That test makes the theoretical assumption that every
state emulates the challenged law and then determines whether,
in that hypothetical setting, double taxation would occur from
that universally adopted law.41 This test
distinguish[es] between (1) tax schemes that inherently discriminate against interstate commerce without regard to the
tax policies of other States, and (2) tax schemes that create
disparate incentives to engage in interstate commerce (and
sometimes result in double taxation) only as a result of the interaction of two different but nondiscriminatory and internally consistent schemes. The first category of taxes is typically
unconstitutional; the second is not. 42

The internal consistency test, Justice Alito wrote, proves that
Marylands tax scheme is inherently discriminatory and operates
as a tariff.43
According to Justice Alito, it is possible for the Maryland
county income tax to comply with the internal consistency test by
means other than a credit for out-of-state taxes.44 However, given
the Maryland county income tax in its present form, the absence
of a credit makes such county income tax unconstitutional.45
The majority in Wynne cut across conventional ideological
lines46 and agreed on the single opinion authored by Justice Alito.
In contrast, the Wynne dissenters were fragmented. In a dissenting
Id. at 1802.
Id.
42 Id. (internal citations omitted).
43 Id. at 1804.
44 Id. at 1806. As discussed later in this Article, creditless compliance with
the internal consistency test would require Maryland to forsake county income taxation of nonresidents on their Maryland source income. See infra
Section II.E.
45 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 180506.
46 Justice Alitos Wynne opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Sotomayor. Id. at 1791. Professor Hellerstein
believes that Wynne reached the right result by requiring the jurisdiction of
residence to provide a credit for the income taxes paid to the jurisdiction of
source. However, he concludes that, to reach this correct result, Wynne engages in doctrinal legerdemain. Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering the Supreme Court
s Opinion in Wynne, 123 J. TAXN 4, 10 (2015).
40
41
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opinion largely joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia adhered
to his long-standing position that there is no constitutional foundation for the dormant Commerce Clause.47 Justice Thomas,
largely supported by Justice Scalia, similarly maintained his view
that the dormant Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the
Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually unworkable in application.48 Justice Ginsburg, in conjunction with
Justices Kagan and Scalia, accepted the existence of the dormant
Commerce Clause but argued that nothing in the Constitution
or in prior decisions of this Court requires the Maryland county
income tax to grant a credit to the Wynnes for the out-of-state
income taxes that they pay.49
II. DISCUSSION
A. Wynne
s TariffAnalogy Is Powerfuland Limitless
The tariff analogy, central to Justice Alitos Wynne opinion, is
both powerful and limitless: Justice Alito is correct that stateimposed tariffs are the quintessential evil against which the dormant Commerce Clause is aimed. The problem is that, in the
modern world, everything state and local governments do creates
a tariff-like effect, potentially creating powerful incentive[s]50
for a resident to invest at home rather than out of state. The tariff analogy, critical to Wynne, thus perpetuates the fundamental
incoherence of the dormant Commerce Clause concept of nondiscrimination. That concept arbitrarily labels some tax policies as
unconstitutionally discriminatory because they encourage in-state
investment while apparently permitting other economically equivalent tax and nontax policies that similarly encourage intrastate
economic activity.
Suppose, for example, that Howard County exercises its authority to lower its general county income tax rate. This lower tax
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 180910 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Attorney Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr. concludes that the three dissenting opinions in Wynne are all
compelling. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., InternalConsistency and the Federal
Income Tax, 77 ST. TAX NOTES 185, 186 (2015).
48 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
49 Id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 180102 (majority opinion).
47

806 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:797
rate encourages the Wynnes to invest at home rather than deploy
their resources out of state. This rate reduction is tantamount
to a tariff 51 as Howard County thereby uses its tax authority to
create a powerful incentive52 to retain the Wynnes investments
at home. Alternatively, suppose that Maryland provides a lowinterest loan to the Wynnes corporation to build a Maryland facility. Suppose further that this loan contains an increasingly
common clawback feature under which the corporation must
repay Marylands largesse if the corporation moves its facility to
another state.53 These policies are similarly tantamount to a
tariff,54 rewarding the Wynnes and their corporation for investing and remaining in Maryland, or penalizing them for moving
resources out of state.
The list goes on and, indeed, encompasses virtually all taxes
and public services. Assume that, as part of the package of incentives for the Wynnes corporation to build a plant in Maryland,
Howard County and Maryland promise to construct new roads
to the plant and also commit to provide state-subsidized job training for new employees at the plant. These incentives are designed
to (figuratively speaking) construct walls (or moats) around
Maryland to keep resources in-state.
As Justice Alito notes, better schools help employers to attract
and retain employees.55 The same is also true of good police and
fire services. Everything the modern state or municipality does
is tantamount to a tariff,56 potentially creating powerful incentive[s]57 for employers and investors to move or stay to receive
such services. There is a broad consensus among tax experts that
tax policies and direct expenditures are interchangeable; tax
subsidies can be reformulated as direct outlay programs and vice
Id. at 180607.
Id. at 180102.
53 See, e.g., Randle B. Pollard, 
Was the DealWorth it?: The Dilemma of
States with Ineffective EconomicIncentives Programs, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
1, 21, 26 (2015) (States will frequently include clawback or recapture language in the contractual agreements that provide the incentives.).
54 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 180607.
55 Id. at 1797.
56 Id. at 180607.
57 Id. at 180102.
51
52
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versa.58 Consequently, if some tax provisions that encourage instate investment are deemed to be unconstitutionally discriminatory because of their tariff-like effects, so too all economically
equivalent direct expenditure programs must also run afoul of
the dormant Commerce Clause because of their identical, tarifflike effects.
In short, the tariff analogy is powerful in its imagery and
limitless in its implications. It is unlikely that the five justices
who comprise the Wynne majority believe that the dormant Commerce Clause precludes states and localities from improving their
routine public services or from lowering their tax rates to attract
and retain employers and residents. This Author similarly suspects that these justices would recoil from the prospect that the
courts, under the rubric of dormant Commerce Clause nondiscrimination, should police conventional public services for their
impact on interstate commerce.
However, the tariff analogy has no convincing limiting principle. If failing to grant a tax credit is unconstitutionally tantamount to a tariff59 because of the powerful incentive60 thereby
created to invest at home, so too other routine tax and nontax policies and services which similarly encourage in-state investments
are also unconstitutional because of their tariff-like effects. It is
arbitrary to label as unconstitutionally discriminatory Marylands
failure to grant the Wynnes a county income tax credit for out-ofstate income taxes while treating as constitutional the remaining
universe of tax and nontax policies which are economically equivalent in their potential to induce in-state investment.
The problem is not a failure of skill or effort. The craftsmanship
and energy with which Wynne was constructed are evident as is
the equally fine scholarship of the commentators who have labored unsuccessfully to bring coherence to the concept of dormant
This consensus has largely been forged under the heading of tax expenditure analysis. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Counterproductive Nature ofTax
Expenditure Budgets, 137 TAX NOTES 1317, 131819 (2012) (summarizing tax
expenditure analysis); Edward A. Zelinsky, Winn and the Inadvisability of
Constitutionalizing TaxExpenditure Analysis, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 2629
(2011), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/994_mx3arnp9.pdf [https://perma
.cc/J58C-2674].
59 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 180607.
60 Id. at 180102.
58
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Commerce Clause nondiscrimination.61 The intractable quandary
is that, in the modern state with its plethora of services and tax
policies, the dormant Commerce Clause concept of nondiscrimination, despite its intuitive appeal and past service, is inherently
incoherent. That concept randomly condemns some state tax policies as unconstitutional because they encourage in-state investment while giving a free pass to economically equivalent tax and
nontax policies that similarly encourage in-state economic activity.
Wynnes aggressive invocation of the tariff analogy perpetuates,
rather than solves, this problem.
B. The Death ofExternalConsistency?
A defender of Wynne might retort that state and local tax and
nontax policies, despite their tariff-like effects, pass constitutional muster under the internal consistency test. If every state
offered the same tax rates, the same loan subsidies with identical clawback features, the same roads and job training, and the
same police, education, and fire services, the Wynnes and their Scorporation would have no incentive to invest in Maryland rather
than in any other state. In the theoretical world of internal consistency, all state policies are identical.
This retort would highlight an enigmatic omission by the
Wynne Court: the Courts silence62 on the subject of external
61 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Essay, Is the Dormant Commerce Cl
ause
Expendable?A Response to Edward Zelinsky, 77 MISS. L.J. 623 (2007); Brannon
P. Denning, Rebuttal, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: Mend It, Don
t
End It, 155 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 202 (2007), https://www.pennlawreview
.com/debates/index.php?id=7 [https://perma.cc/5UGL-7LMW]; Walter Hellerstein
& Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development
Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996). For this Authors contrary views,
see Edward A. Zelinsky, Essay, The Incoherence ofDormant Commerce Clause
Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Denning, 77 MISS. L.J. 653 (2007);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Davis v. Department of Revenue: The Incoherence of
Dormant Commerce Clause Nondiscrimination, 44 ST. TAX NOTES 941 (2007);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Debate, The Time Has Come to Abolish the Dormant
Commerce Clause Prohibition on DiscriminatoryTaxation, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
ONLINE 196 (2007), https://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/index.php?id=7
[https://perma.cc/5UGL-7LMW].
62 Wynne does acknowledge that Marylands Court of Appeals applied the
external consistency test. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793. After that single reference,
however, Wynne makes no mention of external consistency. Id.
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consistency. At one level, this silence is understandable. Once
the Wynne Court declared that the creditless Maryland county
income tax flunks the dormant Commerce Clause test of internal consistency, there was no need to subject that tax further to
the test of external consistency. At another level, however, the
Courts silence on the subject of external consistency leaves a
puzzling gap in the Courts articulation of dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board introduced the twin tests of internal consistency and external consistency as a conjoined pair.63 The test of internal consistency
postulates a hypothetical world in which a challenged law is applied by every jurisdiction.64 The complementary test of external
consistency is a more difficult requirement and asks whether
the challenged tax law actually reflect[s] a reasonable sense of
how income is generated.65 In effect, the external consistency
test is essentially a practical inquiry.66
If we ask how tax rate reductions, industrial development
subsidies, clawback provisions, and routine government activities
such as police, fire, and education services actually work, they are
all tantamount to tariffs in their practical impacts. They all potentially cause resources to be invested in-state rather than outof-state. If the practical inquiry67 of external consistency retains
its substance in light of Wynne, that inquiry suggests that the
powerful but boundless label tantamount to a tariff68 applies to
all tax and nontax policies pursued by states and localities. All
such policies can, like a tariff, in practice bias the interstate
playing field to attract and retain resources within the state that
pursues such policies.
On the other hand, Wynnes silence on the test of external consistency may reflect judicial discomfort with that test.69 Justice
Alitos Wynne opinion can be read as presaging a future formal
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
Id.
65 Id.
66 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 264 (1989).
67 Id.
68 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 180607
(2015).
69 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
63
64
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repudiation of the external consistency test. While internally inconsistent taxes are typically unconstitutional,70 that is not
true of tax schemes that create disparate incentives to engage in
interstate commerce (and sometimes result in double taxation)
only as a result of the interaction of two different but nondiscriminatory and internally consistent schemes.71
The category of internally consistent [tax] schemes72 is where
the external consistency test plays a role, looking at the practical
consequences of taxes that pass the theoretical test of internal
consistency. Justice Alitos opinion indicates that these tax laws,
because they pass the hurdle of internal consistency, are typically [not] unconstitutional.73
If Wynne thereby signals judicial disenchantment with the
external consistency test, Wynne portends a dramatic reduction of
scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause as internal consistency is to be the end of the inquiry, which previously continued to the practical test of external consistency. If, on the other
hand, Wynne leaves external consistency intact, Wynnes robust
embrace of the tariff metaphor implies that nothing states and
localities do is beyond the judiciarys dormant Commerce Clause
supervision because state and municipal policies in practice are
tantamount to tariffs, encouraging in-state investment and economic activity.
Thus, paradoxically and enigmatically, Wynne may either restrict the dormant Commerce Clause by jettisoning the practical
test of external consistency, or broaden the test because all state
and local tax and nontax policies are potentially tantamount to
tariffs in their practical economic effects.
C. The Death ofApportionment?
A further quandary raised by the Courts enigmatic decision
in Wynne is that internal consistency is a test of apportionment.
However, Wynne uses that test to condemn the Maryland county
tax, not for failing to apportion, but for discriminating against
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802.
Id. (parentheses in original).
72 Id.
73 Id.
70
71
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out-of-state activity. This implies either that the scope of the internal consistency test has been broadened to reach issues of discrimination or that the Court is collapsing discrimination and
apportionment into a single dormant Commerce Clause concept.
Wynne acknowledges the much-cited four-part test articulated
in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady.74 Under this test, a state tax
survives under the dormant Commerce Clause if the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,
is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.75
Until Wynne, internal consistency has been a test of fair apportionment.76 CentralGreyhound has been understood as a case
about Complete Autos apportionment test.77 This is also the most
natural reading of CentralGreyhound, in which the Court opined
that New Yorks gross receipts tax imposed on a bus company
should be apportioned based on the ratio of buses in-state and
out-of-state mileage.78 Central Greyhound did not declare the
New York gross receipts tax to be discriminatory, but instead required the tax to be fairly apportioned.79 Similarly, the Court
twice described the Indiana tax struck in J.D. Adams as levied
without apportionment.80
However, Wynne invokes internal consistency, CentralGreyhound, and J.D. Adams to condemn the creditless Maryland
Id. at 1793 (citing 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. For more on Complete Auto, see Edward
A. Zelinsky, Rethinking Tax Nexus and Apportionment: Voice, Exit, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1, 6, 10, 24 (2008).
76 See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989) ([W]e determine whether
a tax is fairly apportioned by examining whether it is internally and externally
consistent.); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169
(1983) (discussing internal and external consistency as component[s] of fairness in an apportionment formula).
77 See Okla. Tax Commn v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 186, 190
(1995) (discussing CentralGreyhound as a matter of apportionment); Goldberg,
488 U.S. at 264.
78 See Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 66263 (1948).
79 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
80 J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311, 314 (1938). Gwin,
White states that the Washington state business activities tax in its practical
operation discriminates against interstate commerce. Gwin, White & Prince,
Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 439 (1939). However, the opinion also states
that the tax is not apportioned to [the taxpayers] activities within the state. Id.
74
75
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county income tax as unconstitutionally discriminatory, not as
improperly apportioned. Again, this leaves us reading tea leaves.
Is Wynne now suggesting that discrimination and apportionment
are the same dormant Commerce Clause inquiries? If so, that
would be a radical transformation of the Complete Auto formula
that treats apportionment and discrimination as independent,
separate hurdles, both of which must be surmounted for a tax to
survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. If not, it is perplexing that the Wynne Court, by deploying the internal consistency
test, struck down the creditless Maryland county income tax as
malapportioned without explicitly saying so.
D. Abandoning Source-Based Nonresident Taxation as an
Alternative to Credits
As noted, Justice Alitos Wynne opinion indicates that Maryland can satisfy the test of internal consistency by means other
than granting a credit to residents for their out-of-state taxes.81
It is, however, Justice Ginsburgs dissent that outlines the alternative by which Maryland can salvage its creditless county income tax as a matter of internal consistency: repeal the county
tax for nonresidents on their Maryland source income.82
Suppose that Maryland embraced this alternative approach,
retaining for its residents a state income tax that grants a credit
for out-of-state income taxes while also retaining for Maryland
residents a county income tax without a credit for out-of-state
taxes. As part of this approach, Maryland would abolish the
county income tax, but keep the state income tax, for nonresidents
who earn income in Maryland. The test of internal consistency
hypothesizes that every other state will pursue this approach as
well. If so, in this theoretical world, the Wynnes would pay the same
total state and county income tax on their in-state investments in
Maryland as they would pay on their out-of-state investments.
To illustrate this, consider the following example under this
hypothetical regime. Suppose that Maryland assesses state income tax at a rate of 5 percent, payable both by residents on their
worldwide incomes and by nonresidents on their incomes derived
81
82

Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1806 (2015).
Id. at 182223 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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from Maryland sources. Every other state adopts an equivalent
state income tax, taxing their respective residents on their global
incomes at a rate of 5 percent while taxing nonresidents at that
rate on in-state income. Suppose further that Maryland and every
other state also levies a county income tax at the rate of 1 percent, payable only by residents on their respective global incomes.
Assume also that Maryland (and every other state) grants a credit
to residents against state (but not county) income taxes for the
out-of-state income taxes those residents pay. To complete the
example, assume that the Wynnes can make an investment in
Maryland which will generate one hundred dollars or that they
can invest in State X to earn that same one hundred dollars.
If the Wynnes, as Maryland residents, make the in-state investment in this theoretical world, they will pay a total income
tax of six dollars: a five-dollar state income tax to Maryland plus
a one-dollar Maryland county income tax. If the Wynnes instead
earn these one hundred dollars in State X, under Xs hypothesized tax system mirroring Marylands tax regime, the Wynnes
again pay six dollars in tax. In particular, they would pay a fivedollar state income tax to X which would be fully credited against,
and thus completely offset, the Wynnes five dollar state income
tax liability as Maryland residents. The Wynnes would pay no
county income tax in State X because there is no county income
tax on nonresidents in Maryland or in X. Finally, the Wynnes, as
Maryland residents, would pay a one-dollar county income tax in
Maryland. The upshot again is six dollars in income tax; namely,
five dollars to state X and one dollar to the Maryland county in
which the Wynnes reside.
Thus, the Wynnes havein this theoretical worldno tax incentive to invest in Maryland rather than in State X. Either way,
the Wynnes total tax burden83 will be six dollars in combined
state and local income taxes.
In the context of international income taxation, systems that
tax solely on the basis of residence are often characterized as
capital export neutral.84 If no tax is payable to the nation in
Id. at 1805.
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH ET AL., U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 28183 (3d ed. 2011); CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF
83
84
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which a nonresident earns income, an individual will pay the
same single tax to his nation of residence wherever he earns that
income. Hence, taxes play no role in the individuals decision
whether to invest at home or abroad since he will pay the same
income tax to his nation of residence either way.
In a similar vein, Wynne indicates that there is no tariff-like
bias for in-state investment if a state or locality taxes its residents
on their worldwide incomes, forsakes taxation of nonresidents on
the income they earn within the state or locality, and grants no
credit for taxes paid to other jurisdictions. If such a system were
adopted universally, a resident would pay the same state and
local income taxes whether she invests at home or out-of-state.
New York City implements this approach under that citys
municipal income tax, which applies to residents but not to nonresidents.85 Under the test of internal consistency as explicated
by Wynne, New York City need not offer its residents a credit for
out-of-state income taxes because New York City obtains internal
consistency by not taxing nonresidents on their income earned in
the city. The New York City tax is thus capital export neutral
and passes constitutional muster under Wynne.86
Wynne consequently offers states and localities two choices to
comply with the requirements of the dormant Commerce Clause:
either grant credits to residents for the out-of-state income taxes
such residents pay or eschew nonresident income taxation.
E. What Kind ofCredits Must Be Granted to SatisfyWynne?
What kind of credit must be granted to resident taxpayers if
a state or locality wants to tax nonresidents on their earnings
within the state or locality? Not all credits are alike. A minority
of states, including Maryland,87 grant their residents income tax
credits against any income tax such residents pay out-of-state.88
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS: MATERIALS, TEXT AND PROBLEMS 2021 (4th
ed. 2011).
85 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1301(a) (McKinney 2015).
86 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
87 See MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-703(a) (West 2015).
88 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Apportioning State PersonalIncome Taxes to
Eliminate the Double Taxation ofDualResidents: Thoughts Provoked by the
Proposed Minnesota Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 533, 546 (2014).
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However, most states only grant a credit for out-of-state taxes
levied on income earned within the taxing state.89
To see the importance of this distinction, suppose that the
Wynnes make an investment in Maryland but that State X nevertheless taxes the income from that investment under an extraterritorial use of its taxing authority. Suppose, for example, that the
Wynnes invest in a Maryland casino and that State X asserts that
the Wynnes must pay Xs income tax on their casino-based income
because residents of State X drive into Maryland to gamble. The
income tax asserted by State X in this context violates Due Process
because this tax reaches extraterritorially beyond Xs borders.90
Nevertheless, some states persistently impose income tax beyond
their respective boundaries despite the limitations constitutionally imposed upon them by the Due Process Clause.91
If so, need Maryland grant a credit to the Wynnes for State Xs
extraterritorial income tax? Today, Maryland is in the minority
of states that grants a credit for any income taxes paid by a resident to another state without limiting its credit to taxes levied by
See id. at 54648.
See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 27273 (1978) (stating
that, in order to avoid extraterritorial taxation, Due Process requires that the
income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to
values connected with the taxing State) (citation omitted); Shaffer v. Carter,
252 U.S. 37, 55 (1920) (explaining that a state may only tax a nonresidents income which actually arises in the state); see also WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET
AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 38691 (10th ed. 2014).
91 The most important example today of a state taxing beyond its borders
is New Yorks income taxation of nonresidents on days they telecommute from
their out-of-state homes. For more on New Yorks so-called convenience of the
employer taxation, see 2 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN,
ST. TAXN ¶ 20.05[4][e][i] (3d ed. 2015); HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 90, at
391402; Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in our NationalEconomy, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 885, 922 (2008); Nicole Belson Goluboff, Back
in Business with the Multi-State Worker Tax Fairness Act, 72 ST. TAX NOTES
101, 102 (Apr. 14, 2014); Nicole Belson Goluboff, State TaxReform: The Modern Solution to Keep Workers Mobile and Businesses Resilient, TAX MGMT.
WKLY. ST. TAX RPT. 5, 811 (July 18, 2014); William V. Vetter, New York
s
Convenience of the Employer Rule Conveniently Collects Cash from Nonresidents, Part 2, 42 ST. TAX NOTES 229, 238 (Oct. 23, 2006). For this Authors
most recent comments on New Yorks employer convenience rule, see Edward
A. Zelinsky, Combining the Mobile Workforce and the Telecommuter TaxActs,
65 ST. TAX NOTES 319 (2012).
89
90
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the second state on income arising within its own boundaries.92
Does Wynne require such a liberal credit, or could Maryland, like
the majority of states, instead deny its resident a credit for an
out-of-state tax levied on income that does not arise within the
taxing state? Wynne does not say.
The majority rule satisfies the internal consistency test, but
only if the taxing state itself assesses no tax on income arising
outside its boundaries. To see this, let us modify in two respects
the example of the Wynnes investing in a Maryland casino. First,
let us assume that Maryland switches to the majority rule under
which residents receive income tax credits only for out-of-state
taxes paid on income arising within the taxing state. Second, let
us assume that Maryland affirms that it will not assert state
income taxes against a casino located in State X because Maryland residents cross the border to gamble there.
Under the internal consistency test, State X is hypothesized
to adopt this approach alsoi.e., an income tax credit for its residents only for taxes paid to another state on income earned within
that state and no extraterritorial taxation of the income of an outof-state casino because residents of X cross the border to gamble.
Under these assumptions, the double tax problem disappears because State X, by assumption, no longer taxes the nonresident
Wynnes on their Maryland casino-based income. Thus, Maryland
need not extend any credit to the Wynnes for State X income taxes
because X no longer taxes the Wynnes income.
On the other hand, if the practical external consistency test
still retains substance, the answer might be different. If, in practice, State X taxes the Wynnes on their Maryland casino income,
we have a clash of constitutional principles. Due Process says that
the extraterritorial tax levied by State X is unconstitutional.93
Wynne implies that, in the face of such extraterritorial taxation,
Maryland must grant the Wynnes a credit to avoid tariff-like
double taxation. After Wynne, the Wynnes in this hypothetical
world have a strong Due Process claim against State X to stop its
extraterritorial taxation of their casino-based income earned in
MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-703(a) (West 2015).
See Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 27273 (1978); Shaffer, 252 U.S. at
55; see also HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 90, at 38691.
92
93
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Maryland and a strong dormant Commerce Clause claim that
Maryland must grant them an income tax credit for State Xs
tax. It is not clear in the face of Wynne how this clash should
be resolved.
F. Wynne and the Double State Income Taxation of
DualResidents
Another important issue impacted by Wynne is the double
taxation of dual residents. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine articulated in Wynne undermines the Courts traditional tolerance of the double state income taxation of dual residents. Such
double taxation can encourage a dual resident to undertake singletaxed in-state economic activity rather than make investments
subject to such double taxation.
Wynne does not explicitly address the double state income
taxation of dual residents, as the Wynnes are only residents of
Maryland. Under the heading of domicile, an individual may, for
income tax purposes, be deemed to be a resident of two (or more)
states if both states conclude that it is the individuals permanent home.94 Domicile is a subjective, fact-specific inquiry about
an individuals relationship to a particular jurisdiction as his permanent home. It is possible for the tax collectors in two states
to look at the same facts and each conclude that an individual is
domiciled in his state.95 When this happens, the individual is
taxed twice as a resident of both states that claim to be the taxpayers place of domicile.
Alternatively, for income tax purposes, states have increasingly embraced the concept of statutory residence.96 Under their
statutory residence laws, states assert the right to tax a nondomiciled individual as a resident based on such factors as the
number of days the individual spends in the state and whether
the individual has a permanent place of abode in the state.97 When
one state claims to be the state of domicile and another state
Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 54243.
Id. at 543.
96 See id. at 54346.
97 See id.
94
95
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asserts statutory residence, both states will tax this individual
as a resident on his worldwide income.98
In the context of dual residence, frequently neither state will
grant a credit for some nor all of the taxes paid by the dual resident to the other state of residence.99 As just observed, most states
grant their residents a credit for another states income taxes
only if those taxes are imposed on income that arises in that other
taxing state.100 Virtually all states, under the principle of mobilia
sequuntur personam, attribute investment dividends, interest,
and capital gains to themselves as the state of residence.101 In the
context of a dual resident, the result is often double income taxation as both states assert the right to tax the individuals entire
worldwide dividend, interest, and capital gain income on the basis
of residence without extending a credit to avoid double taxation.102
A similar problem of double state income taxation arises in the
context of IRA, 401(k), and other pension distributions to dual
residents.103 Under federal law, only a state of residence may tax
such retirement distributions.104 However, if two states claim to
be the distributees state of residence for income tax purposes,
double state income taxation again occurs as both states tax this
dual residents retirement distributions and neither state provides a credit for the taxes levied by the other.
In the past, the problem of the double state income taxation
of dual residents was largely a quandary of the ultra-rich.105
However, the problem is moving down the income scale as more
98 See, e.g., Noto v. N.Y. St. Dept of Taxn & Fin., No. 03392/2010, 2014 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 1008, at *11 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 3, 2014) (discussing the double
taxation of a taxpayer domiciled in Connecticut and statutory resident of New
York); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Noto decision and double state income taxation
ofdualresidents, OUPBLOG (June 2, 2014), http://blog.oup.com/2014/06/noto-de
cision-double-state-income-taxation/ [https://perma.cc/G7LR-7DTE].
99 See Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 546.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 548. See, e.g., Ohios codification of mobil
ia sequuntur personam
stating that [a]ll items of nonbusiness income or deduction taken into account
in the computation of adjusted gross income for the taxable year by a resident
shall be allocated to this state. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.20(A) (West 2015).
102 Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 548.
103 See id. at 56061.
104 4 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012).
105 Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 556.
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baby boomers retire and maintain second homes in another state
and as more dual career couples maintain two residences in different states.106 Thus, individuals increasingly find themselves
taxed as residents in two (or more) states because both states
deem themselves to be the individuals state of domicile or because one state is the state of domicile and another state is a
state of statutory residence.107 In either case, two states will tax
this individual as a resident on his worldwide income, often with
no credit being granted by either state to mitigate the double taxation of investment income.108
Historically, the Supreme Court has held that double taxation
from dual residence raises no constitutional issue.109 Wynne challenges that traditional understanding, as the double state income
taxation of a dual resident can be, in Justice Alitos words, tantamount to a tariff,110 creating a powerful incentive111 for the dual
resident to keep his capital at home to avoid double taxation.
Suppose, for example, that a dual resident is domiciled in New
York and is a statutory resident of California, where she maintains a second home. Both states would tax this dual resident on
her worldwide income. Each state, under the principle of mobilia
sequuntur personam, would attribute to itself this individuals
investment income from dividends, interest, and capital gains.
While both states would grant a credit for income taxes assessed
on business income earned in the other state, neither state would
grant a credit to abate the double state income taxation of such
individuals investment income from dividends, interest, and capital gains.
Suppose further that this dual resident must decide whether
to put one hundred dollars into a New York business or to invest
that same one hundred dollars in stocks and bonds. California
would grant this dual resident a credit against its income tax for
Id.
An individual can also be a dual resident because she triggers the statutory residence requirements in two or more states. Id. at 546.
108 See id.
109 Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982) (citing Worcester Cnty. Trust Co. v.
Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937)).
110 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1806
07 (2015).
111 Id. at 180102.
106
107
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New York income taxes levied against New York business income. However, California would not grant a credit against its
income tax for the New York income taxes assessed against the
dividends, interest, and capital gains arising from the dual residents investments in stocks and bonds because California would
attribute that investment income to itself. The resulting double
state income taxation to which this dual resident is subject acts
as a tariff which, in this example, induces her to keep her money at
home in a New York business rather than investing in stocks and
bonds, the earnings of which are income taxed by both states.112
By placing her money in a New York business, this dual resident would be subject only to New York income taxes because
California gives a credit against state taxes levied on business income earned in another state. If the dual resident instead uses her
money to buy investment stocks and bonds, she will be subject to
double taxation as a dual resident because, under the principle of
mobilia sequuntur personam, both New York and California would
tax the dividends, interest, and capital gains generated by these
investments without providing any credit to abate double taxation. The same bias for in-state business activity would occur if
this dual resident were choosing between single-taxed business
income earned by a California business or double-taxed dividends,
interest, and capital gains from investment stocks and bonds.
According to the Wynne Court, this kind of de facto tariff violates the dormant Commerce Clause by creating a powerful incentive for the dual resident to conduct in-state business in order
to pay less state income tax. Wynne thus undermines the Courts
traditional refusal to view the double taxation of dual residents
as unconstitutional. The potential double taxation of dual residents can be tariff-like in its effects when the prospect of such
double taxation encourages single-taxed business activity within
the state rather than double state-taxed investments.
CONCLUSION
Wynne is an important and enigmatic decision with implications extending well beyond the particular facts of that case. The
five-justice Wynne majority made a major statement about the
112

Zelinsky, supra note 88, at 54849.
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dormant Commerce Clause. Wynne perpetuates an inherent problem of the Courts dormant Commerce Clause doctrine: the Court
declares some ill-defined taxes as unconstitutionally discriminatory because they encourage in-state economic activity, while other
economically equivalent taxes and government programswhich
also encourage intrastate investmentare apparently acceptable
under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Wynne raises as many questions as it answers. Among these
are the continuing viability (or not) of external consistency and
apportionment, concepts that have been central to the Courts
formulation of the dormant Commerce Clause. Wynne also undermines the Courts traditional tolerance of the double state
income taxation of dual residents because such double taxation
can encourage a dual resident to undertake single-taxed in-state
economic activity rather than make investments subject to such
double taxation.

